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Abstract: 
This paper uses several ols models to evaluate the impact of sociological, institutional, and 
spatial approaches to turnout across the 330 municipalities of Guatemala. It shows that economic 
development and geographic location (urban vs. rural) have little discernible impact on turnout. 
Turnout, however, varies positively with the share of registered voters who are female, even if 
fewer women are registered to vote and, as a result, actually cast ballots. As turnout has fallen 
through time, the share of registered voters who are literate and the share of the population that is 
indigenous have become negatively associated with turnout. Larger number of citizens turn out 
to vote as municipal size decreases and as the ratio of registered voters to voting stations falls. 
That these factors are significant suggests that, even in a research design that privileges 
socioeconomic variation, spatial–institutional differences help explain voter turnout rates. 
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Artice: 
1. Introduction 
In the study of voter turnout rates, we know two sets of facts. One is sociological: numerous 
survey researchers show that, at the individual level, turnout varies positively with wealth and 
education (see Lijphart, 1997, for a review). The other is institutional: the more competitive and 
accountable the political systems are, the larger the turnout rate is (Cox, 1999; Jackman, 1987; 
Jackman and Miller, 1995). These are findings largely drawn from national-level studies of 
industrial democracies. How both sets of factors interact in the developing world, however, is 
largely unknown. 
 
We use a subnational research design to uncover the social and institutional underpinnings of 
voter turnout in Guatemala. By analyzing turnout at the municipal level, we can vary the social 
conditions that are held constant in most cross- national research on voter turnout rates while 
nevertheless employing the institutional variation necessary to evaluate the consequences of 
electoral laws. We also pioneer the use of three new spatial-institutional variables that measure 
the effects of location, distance, and jurisdiction on turnout rates—factors that geographers claim 
are as important as any other on a whole host of political and social outcomes (Agnew, 1996; 
Dorling et al., 1996; Hodge and Staeheli, 1992). In this paper, we also present novel estimates of 
the size of the electorate—all adults 18 or older—at the municipal level with easily replicable 
demographic techniques. 
 
Like many other new democracies, Guatemala is ethnically complex and economically stratified. 
Approximately half of the population speaks one of the two-dozen Maya languages. About half 
of the population lives in rural areas. According to the UN Development Program, 1999 GDP per 
capita (PPP) was $3,674 (UNDP 2000)—placing it 92nd out of 162 countries the UNDP ranked. 
Guatemala also has witnessed low levels of voter involvement in politics. Since the transition 
from dictatorship in 1985, turnout has fallen from 49% to 30% of all eligible voters in 1995. 
Indeed, Guatemala ranks as one of the least participatory political systems in the world (IDEA, 
1997), a fact that political economists believe is causally linked to low levels of government 
spending and support for democracy (IDB, 2000: 163–99; Seligson, forthcoming). 
 
In brief, we show that institutional factors shape turnout, even in a subnational research design 
that maximizes sociological variation. Most importantly, we find that turnout falls as municipal 
(territorial) size and the ratio of registered voters to voting stations increases. By 1995, in fact, 
turnout was falling by 1% for every increase of approximately 10 registered voters per voting 
station. All things being equal, requiring citizens to cast ballots only in the capital of the 
municipality of residence (regardless of where they live in the countryside or nearby 
settlements)— where, on average, less than 30% of the municipal population lives—maintains 
low turnout rates in Guatemala. We find that turnout varies positively with the share of registered 
voters who are female. Even when controlling for other factors, economic development and 
geographic location (urban vs. rural) have few discernible effects on turnout. And, as turnout 
rates have fallen through time at both the national and municipal levels, the share of registered 
voters who are literate and the share of the population that is indigenous have become negatively 
associated with turnout rates. 
 
The first section contains an overview of Guatemalan politics and its institutional arrangements. 
Subsequently, this paper identifies alternative hypotheses about turnout, presents our variables, 
specifies regression models, and discusses their results. In the conclusion, we explore how low 
turnout rates contribute to the political economic ―trap‖ in which Guatemala is stuck—that of 
low taxes, 
 
social expenditure shortfalls, and unresponsive and thus undervalued governments. 
 
2. Political competition, electoral laws, and turnout in Guatemala 
The rules governing political competition are contained in the 1985 constitution  and its 1994 
amendments. In place of four-year terms of office for presidents and  members of the 
unicameral legislature, the 1994 reforms instituted five-year terms  of office. The Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal convenes a runoff between the two candidates garnering the most votes if no 
candidate obtains an absolute majority of the vote in the first round. Citizens elect deputies from 
multimember districts that are identical to the country’s 22 departments and the separate district 
of Guatemala City (for a total of 23 districts). They continue to be allowed to run for reelection 
and to serve concurrent terms with the president. The number of deputies elected from each 
department varies according to the population of the department (Lehoucq, 2002). 
 
Comparatively low and declining voter turnout rates plague Guatemalan elections. Even the year 
with the highest turnout rates—that of 1985just half of all eligible voters went to the polls. 
Approximately 70% of eligible voters—all men and women 18 years or older—are actually 
registered to vote. Only literate citizens are required to register to vote. Table 1 contains national 
level turnout rates between 1985 and 1995. 
 
The first of two comments to be made about these figures is that they are low by regional and 
international standards. Within Central America, only El Salvador has turnout rates as low as 
Guatemala’s (Seligson et al., 1995). In Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua, turnout hovers 
between 75% and 80% of the voting-age population. Second, these figures conceal an enormous 
amount of variation among municipalities—the jurisdictional level at which the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal begins to aggregate votes. According to the 1994 Population Census, almost 
half of the municipalities (164) are 50 or more percent ladino—an ethnic category best defined 
as not indigenous. Slightly over half of the municipalities (166) are pre- 
 
dominately indigenous.
1
 Using 1995 estimates, Fig. 1 shows the distribution of eligible voters. 
Guatemala City dominates the electoral map; it contains almost 20% of all eligible voters. After 
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  There were 330 municipalities in Guatemala at the time of the 1985 elections. However, we only used 325 for the 
1985 regression analysis because, in the first place, data for the three municipalities created between the 1981 census 
and the 1985 elections are incomplete. In the Department of Quiche´, Chicama´n was split off from Uspanta´n and 
Ixca´n was created from Chajul. In the Department of Pete´n, Santa Elena was split off from Flores. In the second 
place, voter registration data are unavailable for Zaragoza in Chimaltenango and Zapotitla´n in Jutiapa. 
removing Guatemala City, the average number of eligible voters per municipality in 1995 was 
13,226, with a standard deviation of 17,049. 
 
3. Research hypotheses and variables: theory and measurement 
If sociological approaches are correct, then turnout should be higher as the percent of the 
municipal population is more ―modern.‖ This approach sees voters essentially predisposed to 
turning out to vote because support of democracy is said to vary with levels of education and 
wealth (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
 
Standard sociological variables include the percentage of a municipality’s population that is 
urban, that has access to electricity, and that is literate. We measure the effects of economic 
development by using the percentage of households with electricity because no municipal-level 
data exist on GDP rates. Since communities must fund part of the money necessary to bring 
electricity to their settlements, the share of homes in a municipality with electricity is a useful 
proxy for assessing the relative wealth of communities across Guatemala. Modernization theory 
also expects turnout rates to vary positively with literacy rates. Finally, we use the share of the 
registered electorate that is female as a surrogate measure of women’s status within society. So, 
if modernization theory is useful, turnout should vary positively with the share of the registered 
electorate that is female. 
 
There are at least two interpretations of the role of indigenous communities in voter turnout rates. 
In line with modernization theory, one account argues that political participation will be lower 
among indigenous peoples because they belong to local, less participatory political cultures. 
Another, rather different perspective contends that turnout rates will be higher among indigenous 
peoples in Guatemala because they have a long history of local decision-making, solidarity, and 
autonomy (Smith, 1990). 
 
The data for spatial location, electricity, and indigenousness stem from official census sources: 
the 1981 figures are from the General Directorate of Statistics (DGE, 1982a; DGE, 1982b) and 
those from 1994 from the National Institute of Statistics (INE). Unlike the other sociological 
variables, literacy and gender are expressed as shares of registered voters. Data on the literacy 
and gender of voters are from the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE, 1986) and are available for 
each election. 
 
A second view is more political. It assumes that, whatever the sociological predisposition of 
individuals to vote, the basic characteristics of a political system powerfully shape voter turnout 
rates. This approach suggests that turnout varies as a political system becomes competitive, 
automatically registers its citizens, and as the ratio of votes to seats approaches equality 
(Jackman, 1987; Jackman and Miller, 1995; Powell, 1986). The theoretical assumption of these 
studies is that citizens are more likely to become voters as the cost of casting a ballot declines 
(Colomer, 1991). 
 
We use several measures of political-institutional arrangements from cross- national research on 
turnout. We hypothesize that turnout increases with proportionality because the incentives for 
parties to mobilize voters are greater as the value of public office increases. Voters will be more 
likely to turnout if their votes determine the fate of a larger share of legislative deputies. 
Modifying Powell (1986: 38), we assign each municipality a score corresponding to its district 
magnitude or the number of representatives its department elects. 
 
The next measure of institutional impact is the vote–seat deviation. From Lijphart (1994), we 
measure the difference between the percentage of votes received from the percentage of seats for 
the two largest parties in each department. According to Jackman (1987), the disproportionality 
of a voting system varies inversely with turnout: as the number of wasted votes increases, parties 
and citizens become disinclined to vote. Again, we assign the difference between the percentage 
 
 
of votes and seats obtained by the two largest parties in each department to each of its 
municipalities. 
 
The third institutional measure is the index of Laakso and Taagepera (1979) of the effective 
number of parties. According to Jackman (1987) and Jackman and Miller (1995), turnout should 
decrease as the number of parties rises. As executives must form coalitions to govern, 
responsibility for government becomes diffuse. Unable to hold a party accountable, citizens 
refrain from voting. Again, we calculate the effective number of parties by department and 
assign this number to each municipality within its borders. 
 
A fourth institutional factor we employ is one that is commonly called closeness, which varies 
inversely with turnout. Following Cox (1988), we measure closeness by identifying the 
difference in votes received by the two largest parties in each municipality divided by the total 
number of eligible voters, multiplied by 100 to create a percentage. This then represents the 
percentage of additional eligible votes that would be needed by the second place finisher to 
become the first place finisher. The lower the percentage the closer the election and we expect 
this coefficient to be negative. Finally, we expect the number of eligible voters to vary positively 
with turnout because parties will make extra efforts to mobilize voters where there are many 
potential voters. 
 
We also measure the impact of three factors that reflect spatial–institutional differences among 
municipalities. Since polling stations are only located in municipal capitals, we hypothesize that 
participation should drop as the distance needed to travel to vote increases. We measure size as 
the number of square kilometers (km2) in a municipality. We also hypothesize that turnout 
should vary inversely with the time needed to stand in line to cast their ballots. Following legal 
procedure, we operationalize polling station waiting time as the ratio of registered voters to vot-
ing stations (data are from the Tribunal Supremo Electoral); turnout should increase as this ratio 
falls. 
 
We also test for the effects of geographic concentration. We hypothesize that turnout rates will 
be higher in departmental capitals because their population densities are higher. Parties will have 
more incentives to mobilize voters on election day in these municipalities. We use a dummy 
variable to operationalize this variable with departmental capitals being scored a ―1‖ and all 
other municipalities being scored a ―0.‖ This article calculates turnout as the number valid, 
annulled, and blank votes as a share of the eligible population in each municipality (whose 
methods we describe in Appendix A), thus producing the first set of such estimates for 
Guatemala or any other developing country. These estimates also allow us to correct for over 
response rate of more than 40%; in existing surveys, 73% of respondents said they voted in the 
1995 elections (Development Associates, 1996, 2000).
2
 Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for 
all of our dependent and independent variables. 
 
4. The determinants of voter turnout rates: an empirical analysis 
We use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to construct nine models of voter turnout in the 
1985, 1990, and 1995 presidential, legislative, and presidential runoff elections. Tables 3–5 
present the findings of our models. Adjusted R2 of approximately 0.5 indicates that the models 
are well-specified. Residuals are normally distributed and we only detect one problem with 
multicollinearity. The final set of models does not contain the vote–seat deviation variable 
because it was highly correlated with the effective number of parties (r = 0.951 for 1995, r = 
0.780 for 1990, and r = 0.744 for 1985). 
 
Several students of turnout rates recommend against using OLS models because the dependent 
variable is censored—restricted to values of 0.01 to 1—and thus may deflate the T-values of 
individual parameters, especially if it is not normally distributed (e.g., Heckelman, 1995). We 
use what Maddala (1983: 29–30) calls the Minimum Logit Chi-Square Method to see whether 
this is a problem.
3
 Comparison of the OLS with these logged models, however, reveals only 
superficial differences between them. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our models suggest that institutional and spatial variables consistently shape municipal-level 
turnout rates. Indeed, the findings suggest that even fewer Guatemalans would have turned out to 
vote if their municipalities had not been small in size and possessed a low registered voter to 
voting station ratio. Our models also show that the sociological characteristics of municipalities 
are related to turnout levels, though in unexpected ways. The gender variable is consistently and 
significantly related to turnout: as the share of registered voters who are females increases, 
overall turnout increases. As voter turnout rates have fallen through time, however, the models 
show a decline in the importance of economic development 
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  We thank Mitchell A. Seligson for supplying us with this information. 
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  The formula is straightforward: Ln(p/1 — p) where Ln is the natural log and p is the share of value in question 
needing transformation. We thank John T. Williams for bringing this to our attention. 
 
and geographic location (urban vs. rural). They also reveal that, by 1995, literacy and 
indigenousness were becoming negatively related to turnout. 
 
We find that the female share of registered voters varies positively with turnout. This variable 
also is the most important of all sociological factors: for every percentage increase in the share of 
registered females, turnout goes up between half and nearly 1%. Like Power and Roberts (1995), 
who find that the share of females in the labor force (their surrogate for the impact of 
modernization on women) was positively related to turnout rates in Brazil, we interpret this to 
mean that political participation varies with the prominence of women in society. 
 
The other sociological variables have contradictory impacts on turnout rates. As a share of 
registered voters, literacy is only statistically significant in the 1995 presidential and legislative 
elections. Yet, in contrast to sociological arguments, literacy is negatively related turnout: for 
every percentage increase in the numbers of literate registered voters, turnout decreases by 
approximately one-fifth of a percentage 
 
point. Only for the 1985 elections are the percent of the population that lives in urban areas, and 
the percent of households having access to electricity statistically significant and positively 
related to turnout. That these variables become statistically insignificant in later elections 
suggests that a hypothesis worth exploring is whether political disenchantment among more 
urban and more economically developed voters may be fueling increases in voter abstention 
rates. 
 
The share of the municipal population that is indigenous is negatively related to turnout. Its 
statistical significance increases with time and is most apparent in presidential elections. By the 
1995 presidential elections, turnout falls by more than one-half of a percentage point for every 
percentage increase in the municipal population that is indigenous. Curiously, its effects are 
barely noticeable in legislative and presidential runoff elections. This suggests that parties may 
be fielding candidates more attractive to indigenous voters in multimember legislative contests 
than 
 
in presidential races. Furthermore, the stakes of not participating may become clearer for parties, 
indigenous organizations, and voters themselves in runoff elections, where participation is 
restricted to the two presidential candidates obtaining the most votes. 
 
Even after for controlling for a host of sociological factors, the spatial–institutional variables 
have the most consistent effects on turnout. Turnout rates decline as both the size of a 
municipality and the ratio of voters to voting stations increases. The performance of both 
variables indicates that as the distance and time needed to cast a ballot goes up, voters are less 
willing to go to the trouble of voting. In addition, the over-time ratio of registered voters per 
voting station increases in its impact on turnout, and suggests another factor contributing to 
overall declines in voter turnout. This variable is not statistically significant in 1985, suggesting 
that Guatemalans were willing to endure long lines to vote in the first post-transition elections. 
By 1995, however, turnout decreases by almost 1% for every increase in 10 registered voters 
assigned to a voting station in the legislative balloting. 
 
Closeness, as measured by the difference in votes received between the top two vote receiving 
parties, is statistically significant in all elections and all years. Voter turnout rates, however, 
actually increase for every percentage increase in the difference of votes separating first from 
second place winners in Guatemala in all types of elections. The impact of closeness on turnout 
also increases with time or as turnout rates fall across the country. Turnout goes from increasing 
by an average of 0.406% in 1985 in all three elections to an average of 0.621% in all three 1995 
elections. Similarly, turnout actually falls as the number of eligible voters increases. Though its 
effect is small—never more than a quarter to a third of a percentage point at the mean number of 
eligible voters—its effect increases with time because of the increasing number of eligible voters 
and the coefficient remains unchanged (–0.00002). 
 
The unexpectedly positive relationship between closeness and turnout as well as the surprisingly 
negative relationship between eligible voters and turnout both suggest that parties and voters are 
not worried about affecting national-level trends in their municipalities. First, that about half of 
all voters live in often remote rural areas and that polls show an urban bias suggests that parties 
and votes may have little information about the closeness of the race. Second, machine politics 
may be alive and well, especially in rural areas of the country. Locally powerful parties mobilize 
their supporters by, for example, providing them with free transportation to polling locations for 
non-strategic reasons. The increasing importance of this variable over time also suggests that 
machine politics remain salient as independent voters become increasingly disenchanted with 
politics. 
 
6. Conclusions and implications 
In this paper, we use a subnational research design that varies both sociological and institutional 
factors across a large N of cases. We examine the newly democratizing country of Guatemala 
because it contains a great deal of ethnic, social, and economic diversity among its 330 
municipalities. In line with the cross-national study of Anibal Pe´rez-Lin˜an (2001) of Latin 
American democracies, we find that the institutional and spatial variables do shape voter turnout 
rates. In most elections, turnout declines with the number of effective parties. All else being 
equal, more citizens turn out to vote as the size of a municipality decreases. Voters also cast 
ballots if their polling stations—which are only located in municipal capitals— contain larger 
numbers of voting stations. Contrary to theoretical expectations, turnout is greatest where 
political competition is the least intense. That the closeness between first and second place 
winners at the municipal level is positively associated with turnout suggests that local political 
machines mobilize voters for non-strategic reasons. And, in presidential runoff elections, parties 
seem to be concentrating their efforts on mobilizing voters in departmental capitals—a place 
where a disproportionate number of citizens live. 
 
Social structure, however, still counts. Our models show that municipalities with larger numbers 
of registered females voters have higher turnout rates than those with fewer women registered to 
vote, even if fewer women are registered to vote and, as a result, actually cast ballots. Economic 
development and geographic location (urban vs. rural), however, have little discernible impact 
on turnout. And, as turnout rates have fallen through time (at both the national and municipal 
levels), the share of registered voters who are literate and the share of the population that is 
indigenous have become negatively associated with turnout. 
 
The implications of these findings become apparent once we recognize that, as of this writing, 
electoral reform appears to be going nowhere in Guatemala. In June 1998, the Peace Accords-
approved Electoral Reform Commission (consisting of members of Congress and the Supreme 
Electoral Tribunal) recommended overhauling the electoral registry to create a national, 
computer-based, photographic ID card system (Comisio´n de Reforma Electoral, 2000). It also 
suggested that polling stations be located throughout the country, not just in municipal capitals. 
 
The Electoral Reform Commission’s report suggests that many political observers believe there 
is a link between laws and turnout levels—a relationship we empirically document in this paper. 
The failure to enact reforms therefore seems to benefit existing parties and higher income groups 
least interested in mobilizing Guatemala’s largely poor, often illiterate, and frequently 
indigenous voters. Guatemalan parties may find it easier to attract the support of likely voters 
than to persuade citizens to register and to mobilize them on election day. That wealthy 
Guatemalans have not historically championed democracy (and much less encouraged the state 
to spend money on human development) suggests that they also have little interest in increasing 
voter turnout rates. 
 
Like many other developing countries, Guatemala appears to be stuck in an unpleasant political 
equilibrium. Increasing turnout might put more pressure on elected officials to comply with the 
1996 Peace Accords, which called for rapidly increasing state spending on health, education, and 
social welfare—investments that could spur interest in government. Despite the commitment in 
the 1996 Peace Accords to increase taxes, spending on development remains limited because 
central government revenues amount to less than 10% of GDP, placing Guatemala among the 
least-taxed countries in the world (SNUG, 1999: 37–43). Low levels of social spending, along 
with a historically unstable and repressive political system, in turn encourage political passivity. 
Between 1993 and 1999, Development Associates (2000: 18–9) estimates support of the system 
has remained stagnated at around 40%—making Guatemala one of the least supported systems in 
the Americas (Lagos, 1997). Indeed, our findings help to explain why the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank (IDB, 2000: 163–99) finds that there is a strong positive relationship between 
turnout, government spending, and interest in politics. Until political conditions change, 
however, Guatemala will have the dubious honor of being the country that proves how dismal 
this relationship can get. 
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Appendix A 
We use demographic estimates of the municipal-level voting age populations because registering 
to vote is not automatic and leads to inflated turnout rates. On average, approximately 70% of the 
electorate, at the national level, appears to be registered to vote. Furthermore, Boneo and Torres-
Rivas (2000: 46–58) show that the electoral registry has 25% more names than it should because 
of immigration to the US, to other municipalities, and death. Finally, by the 1999 elections, 36% 
of the eligible voters were not registered to vote. 
 
The first step in generating estimates of the voting-age population consists of extrapolating from 
the 1981 (DGE, 1982b) and 1994 (INE, 1995) population censuses. Thankfully, the latter 
contains detailed age pyramids at the municipal level. The former does not; it broke down the 
municipal age structure into the following cohorts: 0–4, 5–9, 10–14, 15–19, 20+. Because there 
is no 20–24 cohort in the 1981 census, we could not use the Karup–King formula for estimating 
the number of 18 and 19 years, which we could have simply added to all 20+ groupings. 
 
Our estimate of the 18 and 19 year olds was based on a more intuitive procedure. We simply 
multiply each municipality’s 1981 report of the 15–19 cohort by the share of the 18 and 19 years 
of this cohort at the national level, for which an age pyramid exists. This yields numbers that we 
add to the last cohort to estimate the size of the electorate in 1981. Since the National Institute of 
Statistics (INECELADE, 1997: 35) estimates that the undercount rate for 1981 is 12.9% and that 
for the more recent census is 13.8%, we divide the figures for each municipality for each of these 
years by the omission rate. This produces a number that we add to each municipality’s voting 
age population. With these numbers, we estimate growth rates for each municipality between 
1981 and 1994 using the following formula: 
 
where t is the year for which the estimate is needed, ln is the natural log and Pt is the 1994 
census count and P0 is the census count for 1981. And, with these numbers, we estimate the size 
of the municipal electorate with the following formula: 
 
where P0 is the 1981 voting age population, e is the natural growth constant (2.71828), r is the 
growth rate, and t is the number of years and months since the last census count. For the 1985 
and 1990 estimates, t is from the 1981 census; for 1995, it is from the 1994 census. 
 
There are a small number of municipalities where our estimate of the voting age population is 
less than the registered number of citizens, facts consistent with a deficient registry that includes 
the names of dead voters (6.7%), citizens who have left their municipality of registration (6%), 
or have not completed the registration process (12%) (Boneo and Torres-Rivas, 2000: 51–5). 
There are 7, 13, and 42 cases in 1985, 1990, and 1995 where the average rate of underestimation 
for these municipalities is 105%, 107.4%, and 110%, respectively. Correlations between our esti-
mates and the numbers of registered voters are extraordinarily high (r = 0.995 for 1995; r = 0.995 
for 1990; r = 0.993 for 1985). In our models, we truncated these numbers at 100%. 
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